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INTRODUCTION

The dual objectives of bankruptcy are first, the financial rehabilitation of debtors and second, the satisfaction, to the greatest extent
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possible, of creditors' claims.1 The first objective promotes the "fresh
start" notion, by holding some of debtor's assets outside the reach of
creditors thereby preventing the bankrupt from becoming a ward of
the state. 2 Leaving the debtor with no post-bankruptcy assets would
make the promise of a fresh start merely illusory. 3 In contrast, the
second objective implies that, in satisfying their claims, creditors
should have the benefit of everything the debtor owns upon entering
4
bankruptcy.
A recent debate focuses on the juxtaposition of these dual bankruptcy objectives and the policy encompassed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 5 ERISA plans, and pension plans similar to ERISA plans, encourage and protect accumulated
savings for retirement years. 6 Whether such pension assets are subject
to creditors' attachment in bankruptcy is the topic of continued legal
debate. 7 The interfacing of the policies behind the two statutory
1.

See Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913) ("tilt is the twofold purpose of the

Bankruptcy Act to convert the estate of the bankrupt into cash and distribute it among creditors
and then to give the bankrupt a fresh start with such exemptions and rights as the statute left
untouched").
2. Id.
3.

Id.

4. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966), in which the United States Supreme Court,
recognizing the conflicting policies, stated: "The main thrust of § 70a(5) is to secure for creditors
everything of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when he files his
petition." Id. at 379.
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) [hereinafter ERISA]).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1001(b) (1988). These sections of ERISA state congressional findings
and declaration of policy. One of the principal purposes of ERISA is to insure that employees
and their beneficiaries will not be deprived of anticipated retirement benefits. Id. ERISA was
enacted to guarantee, through federal regulation regarding establishing, operating, and administering multi-employer and single-employer pension plans, that workers who are promised defined
pension benefits upon retirement and who fulfill the required conditions actually receive the
benefits. Id.
7. Compare In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984) (debtor's interest under ERISA
plan is not excluded as property of the estate pursuant to § 541(c)(2)); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574
(5th Cir. 1983) (ERISA-qualified pension plans are included as property in the estate since the
plans are not spendthrift trusts under state law); and Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir.
1982) (pension benefits from state employees' retirement system may be used to fund Chapter
13 plan); with Lucas v. Holiday Corp., 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Forbes
v. Holiday Corp., 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991); In re McLean, 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985); In re
Pruitt, 30 Bankr. 330 (Bankr. Colo. 1983); and In re Threewitt, 24 Bankr. 927 (Bankr. Kan.
1982) (these courts hold that debtors' interests in funds held in ERISA-type plans are excluded
from estate property); also, compare In re Johnson, 724 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1984) (anti-alienation
provisions in debtor's annuity do not exclude the annuity from property of the estate under §
541(c)(2)) with Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990) (the
anti-alienation provision of ERISA § 1056(d) is a bar to assignment or alienation by creditors).
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schemes of ERISA and bankruptcy leaves creditors arguing for attachment and debtors arguing for protection. 8 Further complicating this
tension between debtors and creditors are employers who, because of
possible liability, worry about the outcome of this policy conundrum.9
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
ERISA's preemptive effect on state laws that exempt ERISA plans
from creditors' claims,1 but, based on Florida's spendthrift trust law,

the question of whether pension funds are part of the bankruptcy
estate remains open in Florida." Spendthrift trust law is significant
to the issue of whether, in bankruptcy, pension assets are attached
or protected, because of the statutory language of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 (Code).3 The Code provides a broad, encompassing
8. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1269.
9. Corporations and employers creating ERISA-qualfied retirement plans for their employees are concerned that if these plans are included in bankruptcy estates subject to creditors'
claims, several negative consequences will flow. One fear is that these plans could lose their
favorable tax treatment under I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) and both employers and employees would be
required to pay income tax on the plan assets. A second fear is that employers could face civil
and criminal penalties for violation of federal pension law. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1131,
1132(1) (1988). For a more detailed discussion of the feared unfavorable tax consequences, see
also In re Balay, 113 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1990); Brief for Intervenor at 33-36, In re
Rosenquist, 122 Bankr. 775 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (No. 89-02287 BKC-6C7).
10. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Servs., 486 U.S. 825 (1988). The Supreme
Court held that a Georgia statute exempting an "employee welfare benefit plan" from garnishment was preempted by ERISA. Id. at 840-41. Therefore, the exemption provided by the
Georgia statute was unenforceable. Id. The Court said the Georgia statute was preempted by
ERISA § 514(a) which provides: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this subchapter [ERISA Title I] and subchapter III of this chapter [ERISA Title
IV] shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan. . .

."

Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).

Florida Statutes § 222.21 exempts from creditors' claims "a retirement or profit-sharing plan
that is qualified under § 401(a), § 403(a), § 403(b), § 408 or § 409 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended." FLA. STAT. § 222.21(2)(a) (1989). On the authority of Mackey and Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983), which hold that ERISA preempts any state
legislation that exempts from creditors' claims either ERISA plans or ERISA-qualified plans,
Florida's statute is preempted by ERISA. The statute does not have to specify ERISA plans
to be preempted; it is enough that the statute affect an ERISA-qualified plan. See Shaw, 463
U.S. at 96-97; Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829-30; see also In re Polombo, 106 Bankr. 724 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Bryant, 106 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); accord Sommers
Drugstores v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034,
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987); In re Siegel, 105 Bankr. 556 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re
McLeod, 102 Bankr. 60 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989); In re Komet, 93 Bankr. 498 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1988), vacated in part, 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
11. See cases cited supra note 7.
12. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1979) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). The federal bankruptcy laws have gone through a
series of changes. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, was substantially revised
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definition of property belonging to the bankruptcy estate. 13 One exception to the Code's expansive definition is property qualifying under
applicable nonbankruptcy law as a spendthrift trust. 14 Therefore, pension assets characterized as a spendthrift trust under Florida law will
be excluded from the bankruptcy estate.
This note will focus on the pension fund as a spendthrift trust issue
and conclude with a recommendation for a statutory solution. First,
however, in section I the note will trace the history of the bankruptcy
and pension policies involved in this conflict. A brief introduction on
the types of relief available to debtors through bankruptcy will be
provided in section II. Sections III and IV will trace the evolution of
the bankruptcy laws' treatment of property excluded or exempt from
the estate, with a focus on early cases that dealt with employment-related property and pension plans. Section V will explain section
541(c)(2) of the Code which carves out the spendthrift trust "safe
harbor," one of the Code's possible protections for pension assets in
bankruptcy. Section VI will highlight various pension plan options.
Section VII will present a survey of primarily Florida bankruptcy
cases that focus on the issue of pension plans as spendthrift trusts.
Finally, the note will suggest a statutory solution in the nature of a
spendthrift trust rollover statute with a caveat about ERISA preemption.
II.

DEBTORS' RELIEF THROUGH THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS

The bankruptcy laws protect individuals from overwhelming debt
through either a liquidation or reorganization plan. 15 Chapter 7, the
liquidation plan 16 of the Code, requires the debtor to turn over all
nonexempt assets for immediate liquidation in order to pay, to the
fullest extent possible, creditors' claims.17 In turn, the debtor is reby the Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, and then repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. 1, 1979). The 1978 Act was
amended by: the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
99-554, § 301(f), 100 Stat. 3124 (1986); and Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-334, § 1, 102 Stat. 610 (1988).
Following common usage, this note will refer to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the Chandler
Act of 1938 as the Bankruptcy Act, and to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and subsequent
amendments as the "Code."
13. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
14. Id. § 541(c)(2). This section has been narrowly construed to refer to spendthrift trusts
under applicable state law. See In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984); see also infra
notes 78-81 & 94-101 and accompanying text.
15. See 11 U.S.C. 99 701-766. 1101-1146 (1988).
16. Id. 99 701-766.
17. Id.
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lieved from any further personal liability for pre-bankruptcy debts. 18
In reorganization, debtors seek protection under Chapter 1119 or Chapter 1320 and agree to a court supervised plan for the payment of some
or all debts. The debtor dedicates a portion of future earnings to
regular payments in accordance with the plan. 21 The issue of whether
pension assets become property of the bankruptcy estate to be liquidated and distributed to creditors will be discussed in the context of
Chapter 7 bankruptcies. The identification of pension assets as property of the estate is relevant in reorganization bankruptcies to the
extent that these funds inflate the total amount of the bankruptcy
estate. The parties to the bankruptcy consider the total amount of
the estate in calculating disposable income available from future earnings to repay debts.2
III.

BANKRUPTcY ACT OF 1898: PROPERTY EXEMPT OR
EXCLUDED FROM THE BANKRuPTcY ESTATE

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act) governed bankruptcy cases
filed prior to October 1, 1979.2 One of its primary objectives was to
"protect debtors and their families from pauperism and to facilitate
[their] rehabilitation. "2 One way to meet this objective through the
statutory framework was to exempt certain property of a debtor from
attachment by creditors.m
Statutes guided the task of identifying exempt property.26 Initially,
exempt property comes into the estate.- Debtors, however, can claim
their statutorily-created exemptions, which protect the property from

18. Id. § 727.
19. Id. §§ 1101-1146.
20. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
21. Id. §§ 1101-1146, 1301-1330.
22. Id.
23. October 1, 1979, was the effective date of the Code. For discussion of the evolution of
the Act, see supra note 12.
24. Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws - Exempt
and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1975).
25. Under the Bankruptcy Act debtors were allowed only those exemptions permitted by
the debtor's state of domicile. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 80 Stat. 544, repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. 1, 1979).
Now, debtors can choose between a federal exemption scheme, or the exemptions of the state
of domicile. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), (d) (1988). This choice is available to debtors unless the state
in which the debtor resides has enacted "opt out" legislation. Id. § 522(b)(2).
26. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 24, 30 Stat. 544, 553, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (effective Oct. 1, 1979).
27. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(d), 541 (1988).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

creditors' claims, up to the value of the exemption.? Another approach
the Act used to meet this objective was to exclude certain property
from the bankruptcy estate altogether.- As a result, the subject of
much litigation under the Act was whether property should be included, excluded or exempted from the bankruptcy estate.3
Under the Act, the provisions for statutory exemptions governed
3 1
questions of whether certain property was exempt from the estate.
Courts, however, determined questions of excluded property based
on judicial interpretation of the purposes of the bankruptcy laws.Because the bankruptcy laws reflect the conflict between the social
policies of making the creditor whole and providing the debtor a "fresh
start," judicial decisions focused on this tension.3 The courts often
weighed the value of a piece of property to pay creditors' claims
against the debtor's reliance on the property to survive post-bankruptcy without public assistance.3 While there were no "bright line"
tests, the courts determined excludability based upon whether the
asset in question was "sufficiently rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past
and so little entangled with the [debtor's] ability to make an unencumbered fresh start that it should be regarded as 'property' under [Bankruptcy Act section] 70a(5). '"
A.

Property Related to Employment: Sufficiently-Rooted Test

The United States Supreme Court has applied the "sufficiently
rooted" test to various types of property arising from employment
activities. In Segal v. Rochelle,36 the Court determined that the debtor's tax refund from past business losses was included in the bankruptcy estate even though debtor's entitlement to the funds did not
accrue until after the bankruptcy was filed.3 7 The refund, according

28. Id. § 522(d).
29. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70, 30 Stat. 544, 565, repealedby Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95 598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (effective Oct. 1, 1979).
30. See, e.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974); Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18
(1970); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
31. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 24, 30 Stat. 544, 553, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95 598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (effective Oct. 1, 1979).
32. See Lee, Leading Case Commentary: Lines v. Frederick, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 115
(1972).
33. See id.
34. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
35. Id. at 380.
36. 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
37. Id. at 380. The property at issue in Segal was a tax refund from loss "carry backs."
Id. The tax laws permit business losses to be "carried back" to prior years that were profitable.
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to the Court, was sufficiently rooted in the past to be considered more
properly as property of the estate, rather than as an asset needed for
a fresh start.s Two factors guided the Segal decision. First, the tax9
refund resulted from activities of the debtor's pre-bankruptcy past.3
that the debtor's fresh start was not
Second, the Court determined
40
dependent upon the refund.
In comparison, in Lines v. Frederick,41 the United States Supreme
Court came to the opposite conclusion by ruling that accrued vacation
pay was excluded property.4 Holding that the vacation pay was part
of the debtor's fresh start, the Court analogized future vacation pay
to a wage substitute necessary to the debtor's future financial wellbeing. 43 The fact that wages are typically given special protection by
the courts influenced the Lines decision."
A later decision, however, emphasized that not all property having
its origin in wages constitutes a wage substitute. 45 A wage substitute46
is employment-linked income saved for the debtor's future support.
In Kokoszka v. Belford,4 7 the Court held that an income tax refund
is property of the estate. 8 The Court distinguished between funds
related to wages that were merely saved and wages set aside specifically to take the place of wages in the future. 49 According to the
Belford court, an item rooted in wages would be excluded from property of the bankruptcy estate only if it was "designed to function as
a wage substitute at some future period and, during that future period,
[was intended] to 'support the basic requirements of ... [a debtor's
life]. '"

I.R.C. § 172(a), (b) (1991) (unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Internal Revenue
Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for 1991). The "carry
backs" can be used to reduce the profits of the earlier profitable years for tax purposes. See
generally E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, THE LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 180 (1986)

(discussing tax loss carry backs).
38. Segal, 382 U.S. at 379-80.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 400 U.S. 18 (1970).
42. Id. at 20.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
46. Id. at 647.
47. 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
48. Id. at 648.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting Lines, 400 U.S. at 20); see also Segal, 382 U.S. at 379 (future wages of
the bankrupt do not constitute 'property' at the time of bankruptcy").
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Pension Plans: Wage Substitute Test

A theme throughout these early cases is the courts' struggle to
balance the tension between excluding property for the benefit of the
debtor's fresh start and including property for the satisfaction of creditors' claims.51 The courts developed a two-prong test to aid in the
determination of whether property should be excluded from the estate.
First, as the Segal Court hypothesized, courts would determine
whether the property was sufficiently rooted in the debtor's pre-bankruptcy past or whether the property was necessary to the debtor's
fresh start. 52 Secondly, if the property was necessary to the debtor's
fresh start, courts would determine whether the property constituted
a wage substitute. This would be accomplished by applying a "property akin to wages" test as set forth in Lines and Belford. The second
test differentiated property rooted in wages but having no specific
designated future use from other wage-related property specifically
designated for the debtor's future support and maintenance. The
latter property constituted a wage substitute.5 Courts excluded wage
substitutes earmarked for the debtor's future support from the estate.Courts have used the wage substitute line of reasoning to determine
whether pension assets belonged to the bankruptcy estate. 57 In Turpin
v. Wente,5 for instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found that pension benefits were excluded from the bankruptcy estate. 59 The court reasoned that pension assets constitute a
wage substitute or future wages necessary to provide the debtor with
the basic requirements of life.6
Other courts, however, have been less willing to accept the wage
substitute argument in the case of Keogh plans61 and individual retire-

51. See supra notes 1 & 4 and accompanying text.
52. See Segal, 382 U.S. at 380.
53. Lines, 400 U.S. at 20.
54. See id.; Belford, 417 U.S. at 658.
55. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 41-44 & 50 and accompanying text.
57. See Turpin v. Wente, 644 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th
Cir. 1975) (pension benefits were not included in the bankruptcy estate in these cases because
they were held to be wage substitutes).
58. 644 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1981). Although decided subsequent to the effective date of the
new Code, the old Bankruptcy Act was controlling in this case. Id.
59. Id. at 475.
60. Id.
61. A Keogh plan is a retirement plan maintained by a sole proprietorship or partnership,
but is otherwise similar to a corporate pension or profit sharing plan. Keogh plans are authorized
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ment accounts (IRAs)c The distinction in cases dealing with IRA and
Keogh plans turned on the ability of the debtor to have access and
control of the plan assets after debts had been discharged in bankruptcy, but before the debtor's retirement.6 The possibility that the debtor
could access and control the assets before retirement provided less
certainty to the courts that the pension funds would be used at a time
when a wage substitute was necessary.6 Thus, because the debtor
maintained control, the property lost its wage substitute characterization and became property of the estate due to the property being
"sufficiently rooted in pre-bankruptcy." '
Control by the debtor over pension assets influenced court decisions
regarding excludability from the estate.6 Courts have attempted to
set standards for distinguishing assets which were excluded from the
bankruptcy estate because they were vital to the debtor's fresh start
from assets which were included in the estate because of their accessibility to the debtor before retirement. Courts have based some of
these standards on whether payments were to be made "during a time
'' 7
when the pensioner may well have no or few other sources of income, 6
and whether the debtor had the right to withdraw money from a
pension fund prior to retirement.68
under ERISA and are tax exempt under I.R.C. §§ 401, 501. Pre-retirement withdrawals are
subject to a penalty tax. I.R.C. § 72(m)(5).
62. An individual retirement account is similar to a Keogh plan but can be maintained by
any individual whether employed by others or self-employed. Contributions to an IRA are tax
deductible. I.R.C. § 408.
63. See In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 94 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978). After reviewing
cases involving tax loss carrybacks, income tax withholding, vacation pay plans and government
retirement plans, the Mace court decided to include the debtor's IRA as property of the estate:
While the ostensible purpose of establishing an IRA is to put funds away for future
use when the depositor is retired and in need of a substitute for wages, this Court
is convinced that to treat an IRA as a substitute for future wages would be
incorrect. In each of the foregoing cases [analyzed by the court] where the asset
was determined to be a substitute for future wages, the bankrupt had only limited
control over the fund so that there was a substantial certainty that the funds would
be used at a time when a wage substitute was necessary.
Id. at 96-97.
Two years later the same bankruptcy court reached a similar conclusion in a case which
involved a Keogh plan. In re Mendenhall, 4 Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980). The Mendenhall
court based its decision on the ability to withdraw funds. "The Keogh plan in the case at bar
provides for withdrawal of contributed funds at any time. . .

."

Id. at 129.

64. Mendenhall, 4 Bankr. at 129.
65. See Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970); Segal, 382 U.S. at 375.
66. See supra note 63.
67. In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1975).
68. See In re Mendenhall, 4 Bankr. 127 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980); In re Mace, 4 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 94 (Bankr. D. Or. 1978).
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BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: PROPERTY EXEMPT OR
EXCLUDED FROM THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE

The Code was enacted in 197869 and shifted the determination of
whether assets are property belonging to the estate from a question
of excludability, to a question of statutory exemption. 70 The Code
broadly defines property of the estate as "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case." 71 This expansive definition allows most property to be included
in the estate and furthers the policy of enlarging the estate to satisfy
creditors' claims.-2 The counter-balancing policy of providing the debtor
a fresh start is achieved through statutory exemptions created by the
Code or state law.73
Entitled to exempt certain property from the bankruptcy estate,
the debtor has the option under the Code to assert the exemptions
permitted under the laws of the state of domicile. 74 Alternatively, the
75
debtor may claim the schedule of exemptions set forth in the Code.
The Code empowers states to enact legislation precluding resident
debtors from choosing the Code's statutorily-created exemptions.76
Thus, the second alternative is not available to debtors who reside in
states that have enacted legislation which elects state exemptions to
77
the exclusion of the Code exemptions.

69. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1974) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). For discussion of the evolution of bankruptcy law,
see supra note 12.
70. Plumb, supra note 24, at 57.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
72. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
73. See Plumb, supra note 24, at 57; 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
75. Id. This section, entitled "Exemptions," reads in part:
(b) [AIR individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property
listed in either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the
State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection
specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection
(d) of this section, of State or local law that is applicable ....
Id. § 522(b).
76. Id. For states that have opted out of the Code's § 522(d) exemptions, the applicable
Code provision is § 522(b)(2)(A). Id.
77.

Id.
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For states that have opted out of the Code's schedule of exemptions, the applicable laws of exemptions are "other federal law" and
state law. s Florida has enacted legislation "opting out" of the Code's
schedule of exemptions. 79 Therefore, an examination of nonbankruptcy
law and Florida law relating to exemptions is essential to the issue
of creditors' ability to attach pension assets in Florida. Crucial to the
nonbankruptcy law examination is spendthrift trust lawso A Code
provision creates the nexus between bankruptcy, spendthrift trust

law, and the issue of whether pension assets belong to the estate. 81
V.

THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST "SAFE HARBOR"s2

The Code provides one exception to its broad definition of property
belonging to the estate. This exception excludes from the bankruptcy

estate an interest of the debtor in property that contains "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust
that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law."' Courts,
after examining the legislative history of this provision, have concluded
that Congress intended by its reference to "applicable nonbankruptcy

law" to exclude from the estate only those "spendthrift trusts" traditionally beyond the reach of creditors under state trust law." There-

78. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). The reference to "under Federal law other than subsection (d)" means other-than bankruptcy (nonbankruptcy) federal law. Id. See supra note 75.
Debtors living in states that have opted out under § 522(b) cannot take advantage of § 522(d)
exemptions. In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 579 (5th Cir. 1983).
79.

FLA. STAT. § 222.20 (1989).

80. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
81. See supra note 14.
82. The author refers to the spendthrift trust "safe harbor" throughout this note. This is
a reference to Code § 541(c)(2), the spendthrift trust restriction. See infra notes 83 & 85.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). This section, entitled "Property of the estate," reads in part:
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of the
debtor in property becomes property of the estate ....
(2) A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust
that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case
under this title.
Id. § 541(c)(1), (2).
84. Id. § 541(c)(2).
85. See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). Section 541 of the Code which defines
property was intended to have a sweeping scope. Id. at 578. The automatic inclusion of property
was intended to remedy much of the old Act's perceived deficiencies: "[The Act was] a complicated
melange of references to State law, and [did] little to further the bankruptcy policy of distribution
of the debtor's property to satisfaction of his debts." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6136).
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fore, property characterized as a spendthrift trusts' under applicable
state law is excluded from the bankruptcy estate under Code section
541(c)(2).8 7 This exclusion provision applies independent of the statutory exemptions and thus, applies in states that have opted out of the
Code-created exemptions.
The question of whether a pension fund qualifies as a spendthrift
trust under state law is central to two issues: (1) Code excludability,
and (2) state exemptions. In theory, if a pension fund qualifies as a
spendthrift trust under Florida law, it is excluded from the bankruptcy
estate by virtue of the Code's exception to its broad definition of
property belonging to the estate.89 In addition, pension assets qualifying as a spendthrift trust would be exempt, if spendthrift trusts are
entitled to an exemption under applicable state exemption claims.-

VI.

PENSION FUNDS AS SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS?

There are several different types of pension or retirement funds;
these include profit sharing plans, savings plans, and deferred income
plans.91 These plans have differing characteristics as to who makes
See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5868.
The issue in Goff was whether the anti-alienation provision in an ERISA-qualified plan was
the type of restraint required under Code § 541(c)(2) to exclude the plan from the bankruptcy
estate. Goff, 706 F.2d at 586. The Goff court concluded that the provision was merely a condition
of obtaining qualified tax status. Id. at 585. This court distinguished an ERISA anti-assignment
and alienation provision from the absolute prohibitions contained in public funded or created
pension and welfare systems. Id. at 585. According to the court, the ERISA anti-alienation
provision encourages and favors qualified plans - it does not prohibit alienation or assignment
of pension funds. Id. In essence, ERISA's anti-alienation provision is directory and not mandatory
and therefore, does not rise to the level of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" that would exclude
the plan from property of the estate. Id. Goff is frequently cited for the proposition that § 541
is a broad, sweeping definition of property and § 541(c)(2) is a narrowly defined exclusion for
property qualifying as a spendthrift trust under applicable state law. See Lichstral v. Bankers
Trust, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985); see also cases cited infra note 108. But see Guidry v.
Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990); cases cited supra note 7.
86. For discussion of qualification as spendthrift trust under Florida law, see infra notes
145-52 and accompanying text.
87. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
88. Id. § 522(d).
89. See supra note 85.
90. This is only theory, because the ERISA preemption doctrine has superseded most state
exemption statutes that either directly refer to ERISA plans or indirectly refer to ERISA plans
by describing an ERISA-qualified plan. See supra note 10.
91. See generally A. COLLINS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
§ 5.02 (1978) (describing pension plan characteristics); Sherman, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of Creditors' Rights, 55 IND. L.J. 247 (1980) (discussing the
impact of ERISA spendthrift trust provisions and I.R.C. § 401 on pension plans).
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contributions to the plan, who assumes the risk of investment loss,
and who controls the conditions for payment under the plan. 92 Despite
these differences, however, many pension plans are funded through
a trust. 3 A trust permits the legal title and the beneficial title to exist

in separate parties or entities. 94 Typically, the employer retains legal
title and control over the investment, administration and distribution

of the plan assets. The employee maintains beneficial title and will
95

receive the assets according to the plan's provisions.
The beneficial interest in a trust is considered a property right;

therefore, the beneficiary's creditors can attach that interest unless
prohibited by direction of the settlor or by statute.

6

Concerned that

creditors might appropriate the funds designated for a participant's
retirement, pension trusts often include spendthrift clauses. 97 A
spendthrift clause is a provision prohibiting assignment and alienation
of a beneficial interest.9

Congress responded to the problem of ensuring that accrued pension benefits are available to a participant at retirement through
ERISA legislation.99 ERISA requires that pension plans contain
spendthrift clauses providing that benefits under the plan cannot be

92. I.R.C. § 401 sets forth requirements for tax-qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock
bonus plans. I.R.C. § 412 describes minimum amounts that can be contributed annually by
employees and employers to corporate or Keogh pension and profit sharing plans, and I.R.C.
§ 415 sets maximum amounts.
93. I.R.C. § 501 exempts pension trusts that meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 401 from
taxation. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(18). Only contributions to trusts qualifying under I.R.C. §§ 401
and 501 are deductible under I.R.C. §§ 219, 404(a)(1)(A). To qualify for exemption, each pension
plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. Id.
94. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 71 (5th ed. 1973).
95. Sherman, supra note 91, at 247.
96. 2 A. ScoTr, TIE LAW OF TRUSTS 1131 (3d ed. 1967).
97. See Sherman, supra note 91, at 247-50.
98. See A. ScoTr, supra note 96, at 1131.
The term [spendthrift] is not altogether felicitous, since it is quite immaterial
whether or not the beneficiary is in fact a spendthrift. The term does, however,
connote the general idea that the purpose of the settlor in creating such a trust
is to protect the beneficiary against his own folly or inefficiency or misfortune. It
is useful, at any rate, as a short phrase indicating that the interest of the beneficiary
is subject to a restraint on alienation, whether the restraint is proposed by the
terms of the trust or by statute.

Id.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1988). This section, entitled "Assignment or alienation of plan
benefits," reads in part: "(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated." Id. § 1056(d)(1).
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assigned or alienated.- ° Therefore, an ERISA qualified pension plan
funded through a trust must contain a spendthrift provision.101
A pension plan trust with a spendthrift clause, however, is not
synonymous with a spendthrift trust under state law. 1' As discussed
above, the spendthrift trust characterization is germane to whether
13
pension assets are safe from the reach of creditors in bankruptcy, 0
because the Code provides a narrow exclusion for property recognized
as a spendthrift trust under applicable state law. 1° The Code, however,
expressly provides that property belongs to the estate "[n]otwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable
nonbankruptcy law . . . that restricts or conditions transfer of [the
debtor's] interest."'10 5 Therefore, the mere existence of a spendthrift
clause does not protect property from the reach of creditors in bankruptcy.0 6 The spendthrift clause must qualify the trust as a spendthrift
trust under state law before the pension assets will be excluded from
the bankruptcy estate. 07
VII.

CASE LAW SURVEY: How MUCH DOMINION AND CONTROL
WILL DESTROY THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST "SAFE HARBOR"

A survey of recent Florida case law demonstrates that the determination of whether a pension fund qualifies as a spendthrift trust
focuses on the amount of "dominion and control" the debtor has over
the assets prior to retirement.10 These cases examine various types
of pension plans, from self-settled IRAs to corporate retirement plans,
in the context of bankruptcy. Differing relationships among the em-

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1983). Section 541(c)(2) is narrowly construed
and does not cover ERISA anti-alienation clauses. Therefore, pension funds with ERISA antialienation clauses are not excluded from the bankruptcy estate. But see Lucas v. Holiday Corp.
924 F.2d 597, 603 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Forbes v. Holiday Corp., 111 S. Ct. 2275
(1991) (pension funds containing ERISA anti-alienation clauses are excluded from the bankruptcy
estate under § 541(c)(2)).
103. Id.
104. Id.; see also supra note 85.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (1988).
106. See cases cited supra note 102.
107. Id.
108. See In re Bryant, 106 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Colvin, 81 Bankr.
679 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Monahan, 68 Bankr. 997 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re
Forbes, 65 Bankr. 58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); In re Lawson, 67 Bankr. 94 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1986); In re Nichols, 42 Bankr. 7'12 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (cases discussed in text infra, pp.
83-88).
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ployer, the employee, and the plan lead to different degrees of control
over plan assets by the beneficiary. There is an inverse relationship
between the amount of control the debtor exercises over the plan and
the likelihood that the plan will qualify as a spendthrift trust. The
more control the debtor/beneficiary has over the pension funds, the
less likely that the court will characterize the plan as a spendthrift
trust. 109

Two factors are pivotal in determining if a plan qualifies as a
spendthrift trust. First, courts consider whether a plan is employercreated or employee-created. An employee-created fund is commonly
referred to as a self-settled plan.10 Second, courts consider whether
the beneficiary has any control over or a right to distribution from
the plan.," Distribution upon voluntary termination of employment
may constitute sufficient control so as to disqualify the plan as a
spendthrift trust. 1 2
A. Self-Settled Plans
In a seminal case, In re Goff,13 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that self-settled Keogh plans which place only a ten percent
tax penalty limitation on withdrawal do not qualify as spendthrift
trusts."1 4 In Goff, both the self-settled nature of the plan and the

possibility of distribution constituted control by the beneficiary/debtor
over the plan.1 5 Therefore, the plan did not qualify as a spendthrift
trust safe from the reach of creditors in bankruptcy. 116 The court left
open the question of whether employer-created plans that allow withdrawal only upon termination qualify as spendthrift trusts under state
law.li*

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit followed Goff in Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust."5 The Lichstrahl debtor
was the sole director, officer, and stockholder of a professional association that created two ERISA-qualified plans." 9 Despite the anti-

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See cases cited supm note 108.
See Brooks v. Interfirst Bank, 844 F.2d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id.
Id.
706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). For additional discussion of Goff, see supM note 85.
Goff, 706 F.2d at 589.
Id.
Id.
Id.
750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1489.
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alienation provisions in the trusts, the settlor reserved the power to
amend or terminate the trusts. 120 Also, under the trust provisions
121
employees could borrow from the trusts.
The court ruled that these self-settled plans did not qualify as
spendthrift trusts under Florida law.1 According to the Lichstrahl
court, "because the purpose of a spendthrift trust is to protect the
beneficiary from himself and his creditors, such a trust fails where
the beneficiary exercises 'absolute dominion' over the property."1
Because the debtor, as sole officer and director of the settlor professional association, could amend or terminate the trusts, the court
reasoned that he "enjoyed 'absolute dominion' over the property of
the trusts."1 4
Public policy persuaded the Lichstrahl court that the plan was not
a spendthrift trust.1 5 "[T]here is . . .a strong public policy that will
prevent any person from placing his property in what amounts to a
revocable trust for his own benefit which would be exempt from the
claims of his creditors.12 6 The court recognized the inequities in allowing the debtor absolute dominion over assets that are, at the same
time, unavailable to satisfy creditors' claims.12 Such funds, according
to the court, would induce creditors to extend credit, while remaining
immune from creditors' claims for satisfaction of the debt.'? The court
concluded that the following factors constituted "absolute dominion"
over the trust property: contribution by the employee, control to
amend or terminate the plan, and ability to borrow from the plan.'2
Another type of self-settled plan is an IRA. 130 A Florida court
addressed the issue of IRAs in In re Gillett.31 In that case, the debtor
argued that his IRA was protected by a state exemption statute and
met the anti-alienation provision requirements of ERISA. 132 The court,
however, found that the self-settled nature of the account and the

120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1490.

123.

Id.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
I.R.C. § 408. For brief discussion of IRA accounts, see supra note 62.
46 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
Id. at 643.
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right to withdraw the funds at any time subject only to an interest
and tax penalty for premature withdrawal constituted "complete and
unfettered" control over the funds by the debtor. 1" Consequently, the
IRA was not exempt property of the bankruptcy estate."'
Following this line of cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Brooks v. Interfirst Bank' concluded that the debtor's ERISA plan
did not qualify as a spendthrift trust and thus, was included in the
bankruptcy estate.1 6 The debtor was one of thirty-two doctors comprising a professional association that had established the plan in question. 137 The doctors rotated turns serving as directors of the association. 1 8 The directors determined the amount to contribute to the plan
and whether to amend or terminate the fund." 9 Therefore, the Brooks
court reasoned that the debtor, either directly or through elected
representatives, had control over the fund.' 4o
Furthermore, the court found that the debtor could "borrow from
the trust to buy a house, educate his children or to meet any hardship,
a term not defined by the Plan.''4 In addition, the debtor could terminate his membership with the association and receive his funds.'42
All these factors, according to the court, created a self-settled plan
with the right to control distribution.'" Consequently, the plan did
not qualify as a spendthrift trust because the debtor had dominion
and control over the funds.'"
A final example of a self-settled plan that did not qualify as a
spendthrift trust is illustrated by In re Nichols.'45 The debtor in
Nichols had a right to receive $5,000 from the trust and could compel
its distribution.146 Further noting the debtor's ability to borrow from
the trust fund, the court concluded that the debtor had sufficient
control over the funds to disqualify the funds from protection under
147
Florida spendthrift trust law.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 644.
Id. at 645.
844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 263-64.
Id.
42 Bankr. 772 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984).
Id. at 776.
Id.
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The Nichols court reviewed Florida law pertaining to spendthrift
trusts. The court cited three factors that are essential to the creation
of a spendthrift trust. 148 First, the trust must be secured against the
beneficiary's own "improvidence and incapacity. '149 Secondly, the trust
must bar the voluntary or involuntary alienation of the life beneficiary's
interest in his right to receive income.-' ° Finally, the settlor must
clearly manifest an intention to restrain the beneficiary from alienating
his interest. 151 Absent these factors, the Nichols court determined that
a plan does not qualify as a spendthrift trust under Florida law.152
The above cases involve self-settled plans in which the debtor/beneficiary could amend, terminate or borrow against the plan. Such
factors combined to disqualify the plans' protection from creditors'
claims under a spendthrift trust characterization. In contrast, the following cases involve employer-created corporate plans in which the
debtor/beneficiary is one of hundreds or thousands comprising the
plan's participants. These cases demonstrate that even where the control of establishing, maintaining and administering the plan is far removed from the individual debtor/beneficiary, courts differ as to
whether the plan is a spendthrift trust.
B.

Employer-CreatedPlans and the DistributionUpon Termination
Factor

A Martin-Marietta retirement fund was the subject of dispute in
In re Bryant.1- The plan in question was basically a savings plan in
which the company matched employee contributions. - The debtors
argued that "the [assets] held in the plan on their behalf are not
property of the estate to begin with because they, in fact, qualify as
spendthrift trusts."'155 Under the plan, the employee could receive the
funds from the plan either upon death, retirement or reaching the age
of seventy.' 5 6 In the event, however, that the employee terminated

148. Id. The court cited to a 1911 Florida Supreme Court case which recognized spendthrift
trusts as "[d]esigned to provide a fund for the maintenance of the beneficiary while at the same
time securing it against the beneficiary's own improvidence and incapacity." Id. at 776 (citing
Croom v. Ocala Plumbing & Elec. Co., 62 Fla. 460, 57 So. 243 (1911)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 106 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
154. Id. at 728.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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employment with the company, he 57
was entitled to withdraw the value
of his vested interest in the plan. 1
The Bryant court refused to exclude the funds from the bankruptcy
estate. 16 The determining factors that disqualified the plan from
spendthrift trust protection, according to the court, were the ability
to borrow against the funds and the ability to withdraw the vested
portion upon termination of employment. 15 9 Important to the court's
reasoning was the fact that the debtor had the ability to manipulate
the funds. 160 This control over the funds was sufficient 161
to disqualify
protection under the Code's spendthrift trust exclusion.
Another case involving a corporate plan answered the question left
open by Goff.16 In re Lawson's' focused on whether an employercreated plan allowing withdrawal upon termination qualifies as a
spendthrift trust. 16 The corporation's Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP) allowed distribution only upon retirement, death or termination of employment. 165 In addition, the plan did not allow loans to
participants. 1e
Distinguishing the ESOP from a self-settled plan like the one in
Goff, the Lawson court held that the ESOP was a spendthrift trust
and therefore, excluded from the property of the estate. 67 Because
of the distribution limitations and the "no loan" provision, the court
determined that the debtor did not exercise "absolute dominion" over
the assets in the plan.'6 The debtor's ability to withdraw funds upon
termination of employment did not disqualify the plan as a spendthrift
trust in Lawson.169
In contrast, the Bryant court weighed the factor of distribution
upon termination on the side of disqualifying the plan from spendthrift
trust protection. 170 The distribution factor in Bryant was coupled with
the debtor's ability to borrow against the plan. 171 Unlike the Bryant
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 729.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
67 Bankr. 94 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986).
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bryant, 106 Bankr. at 729; see supra text accompanying notes 157-61.
Bryant, 106 Bankr. at 729.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

plan, the Lawson plan did not have a loan provision." 2 In reconciling
Lawson and Bryant, the courts appear persuaded by the notion that
the distribution upon termination factor alone is not enough to disqualify the employer-created type plan as a spendthrift trust. Rather,
courts will examine additional factors, specifically whether employees
may borrow against the plan.
Two Florida cases addressed the distribution upon job termination
factor and determined that this factor will not destroy the plan's status
as a spendthrift trust. The court in In re Colvin3 recognized that
the right of a debtor to leave a job and thus, access plan funds, lies
within the debtor's discretion.'- Such discretion, the court held, does
not constitute "absolute dominion" over a retirement plan.'- 5 The Colvin court noted, "[h]aving to leave employment in order to receive
retirement benefits is a significant restriction upon the exercise of
that right.' ' 76 Similarly, the court in Gennet v. ICMA Retirement
Corp.- held that "employment termination is a significant restraint
upon withdrawal of [debtor's] benefits."' 17 In these cases, as in the
Lawson case, the courts excluded the plans from the bankruptcy estate
17 9
based on the plans' status as a spendthrift trust.
One final case presents a different combination of the factors previously discussed. The plan in In re Monahanw0 included both employee
and employer contributions.' 8 ' The court held that the employercontributed portion of the plan was a spendthrift trust protected from
creditors' claims in bankruptcy.,- The employee-contributed portion
of the plan, however, was property belonging to the estate and thus,
not a spendthrift trust.'3 The distinction, according to the court,
turned on the amount of control the employee/debtor exercised over
each portion of the plan.'4

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Lawson, 67 Bankr. at 98; see supra text accompanying note 166.
81 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id.
65 Bankr. 58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
Id. at 59.
See Colvin, 81 Bankr at 682; Gennet, 65 Bankr. at 59.
68 Bankr. 997 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
Id. at 998.
1d. at 1000.
Id.

184.

Id.
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In analyzing the plan, the Monahan court followed Colvinm and
Gennet'1 in determining that a distribution upon termination factors7
was a sufficient restraint on the employee's control over the plan.'
As in Colvin'1 and Gennet,'19 the employee/debtor in Monahan could
withdraw his total interest in the plan upon termination of employment. 190 In all three cases, the distribution upon termination factor
did not disqualify the plan as a spendthrift trust.
The factor in Monahanthat did disqualify the employee contributed
portion of the plan from spendthrift trust protection was the hardship
loan provision. 191 The employee in Monahan could request, in the

event of extreme hardship, a loan against his contributed interest in
the plan. 192According to the court, these hardship requests were within
the sole discretion of the plan's advisory committee and trustee to
grant or deny. 19 Noting that the hardship loan decisions were outside
the control of the employee, the Monahan court reasoned that a circumstance such as bankruptcy made distribution through loan approval
certain. 194 Therefore, the employee-contributed portion of the plan became property of the estate based on the court's determination that
95
the debtor's bankruptcy would affect early distribution of the funds. 1
In addition, the Monahan court distinguished a showing of hardship
1
through bankruptcy from the affirmative action of quitting a job. 9
As in Colvin 97 and Gennet,198 the Monahan court characterized a distribution upon termination as a significant restraint on the debtor's
absolute control over the funds. 199 The Monahan court, however, did
not provide reasoning for its distinction between filing for bankruptcy

185. Receiving a lump sum payment from an employer-created retirement plan upon early
termination of employment did not disqualify the plan as a spendthrift trust under Florida law.
Colvin, 81 Bankr. at 681-82.
186. The debtor's deferred compensation plan was excluded from property of the estate as
a spendthrift trust. Gennet, 65 Bankr. at 59.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Monahan, 68 Bankr. at 1000.
Colvin, 81 Bankr. at 681-82.
Gennet, 65 Bankr. at 59.
Monahan, 68 Bankr. at 1000.
Id.

192. Id. at 999.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 1000.
Id.

196.

Id.

197.

Colvin, 81 Bankr. at 681-82; see supra note 185.

198. Gennet, 65 Bankr. at 59; see supra note 186.
199. Monahan, 68 Bankr. at 1000.
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and leaving a job as factors used in determining the debtor's amount
of dominion and control over the funds. While both actions potentially
lie within the discretion of the debtor, 200 filing bankruptcy in order to
a restraint upon withdrawal
access the funds seems to be as significant
20 1
of benefits as terminating employment.
In analyzing the Monahan case, a more obvious reason for the
differing results in the court's treatment of the employer contributed
and the employee-contributed portions of the plan emerges. 2 - Consistently courts have treated self-settled plans differently than employercreated plans in the spendthrift trust analysis. 20 3 As the preceding
analysis indicates, a self-settled plan in which the beneficiary has any
control over distribution before retirement, typically will not qualify
as a spendthrift trust. 20 4 The employee-contributed portion of the
Monahan plan was, essentially, a self-settled plan with a loan provision.
Another factor which contributed to the disparate outcomes of
these cases involving self-settled and corporate plans was a loan provision in the plan. The cases of Brooks, 205 Bryant, and Monahan illustrate that courts equate an employee's ability to borrow with dominion
and control. When a beneficiary can control distribution of assets
through loan requests, even when the total discretion rests in a third
party and even when conditions of severe hardship are required, the
plan will not qualify for protection in bankruptcy under the "safe
harbor" of a spendthrift trust.
VIII.

A

BANKRUPTCY/ERISA
POLICY CONUNDRUM

STATUTORY SOLUTION TO THE

The courts' treatment of pension plans in bankruptcy has come
full-circle. The sufficiently-rooted 2° and wage substitute20° tests of the
200. Id.
201. While a discussion of the effects of bankruptcy on an individual debtor is beyond the
scope of this note, the Monahan court's distinction between employment termination and bankruptcy raises the following caveat. A Chapter 7 debtor relinquishes all his nonexempt property
for liquidation. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 704 (1988). The process of turning over assets is certainly
more intrusive to an individual than a scenario in which an individual leaves one job for another.
Also, the effects of bankruptcy linger with the individual debtor for six years under Chapter 7
and three to five years, depending on the length of the plan, under Chapters 11 and 13. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766, 1101-1146, 1301-1330 (1988). Perhaps, the Monahan court's discussion on
this point was directed toward other unexplained hypothetical circumstances.
202. Monahan, 68 Bankr. at 998.
203. See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 589 (5th Cir. 1983); supra note 85.
204. Goff, 706 F.2d at 589.
205. Brooks v. Interfirst Bank, 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988).
206. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss1/3

22

Day: Pension Funds in Bankruptcy: The Spendthrift Trust "Safe Harbor"
PENSION FUNDS IN BANKRUPTCY

pre-Code courts are strikingly similar to the dominion and contro20
test of today. All three tests require a judicial weighing of the ability
of the property in question to serve the policies of bankruptcy. The
judicial determination focuses on the value of the property to serve
the conflicting policies of making the creditors whole or providing the
debtor a fresh start. 9 The problem of placing pension funds on either
side of the judicial scale is complicated by the fact that pension assets
are encumbered with a purpose. As previously stated, the purpose of
pension plans is to encourage and protect accumulated savings for
retirement years.
In balancing the policies of bankruptcy against the purpose served
by pension funds, the courts are in agreement under one set of circumstances. When a plan is established with the express purpose of
providing for retirement income, courts, under any test, place this
type of pension plan on the side of providing the debtor a fresh start.
Courts have determined that this type of plan is property that is not
21
210
sufficiently-rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past, is a wage substitute, '
2
and is not under the dominion and control of the beneficiary/debtor . 12
The problem for the courts and for the parties whose interests are
in doubt, arises when the plan, in its operation, dilutes the original
purpose supporting pension plans in general. Essentially, when the
plan's funds can be accessed before retirement, balancing the rights
of debtors and creditors within the context of a social policy that
encourages and protects the accumulation of retirement income leads
to disparate court results.213 This policy conundrum creates uncertainty
24
for parties in bankruptcy. 1
While a tension in conflicting policies is certainly not unique to the
issue of pension plans in bankruptcy, the principles courts have relied
upon to resolve this issue have been flux. The Code's framework for
determining property of the estate shifted from the pre-Code exclusion
analysis to an exemption analysis.215 One of the key differences occasioned by this shift is the "seat" or location of the decisionmaking

207. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
208.
209.
33-34.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

215.

See supra text accompanying notes 123-29.
See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying notes
See
See
See
See
Id.

supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying notes 123-29.
supra notes 113-44 and accompanying text.

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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process. As previously discussed, the exclusion analysis is based on
judicial interpretation; 21, an exemption analysis is based on statutory
2
construction. 17
The courts become the "seat" of the decisionmaking process in the
exclusion analysis while legislatures become the "seat" of the decisionmaking process under an exemption analysis. To recognize the court
or legislature as the "seat" of the decisionmaking process is to identify
the source making the -policy choices. 21 s This distinction is important
when considering that individual debtors in bankruptcy do not have
to protect
the financial resources to pursue extended litigation in order
219
their pension assets from creditors' claims in bankruptcy.
In addition, a change in the Code's treatment of property belonging
to the estate empowered the individual states to make their own policy
choices.- ° The Code provides in section 522(b) that individual states
could apply state-created exemptions to resident debtors in bankruptcy
in lieu of the Code created exemptions.2' Florida has opted out of the
Code's section 522(d) exemptions.- Therefore, Florida exemption statutes control decisions regarding property exempt from creditors' attachment in bankruptcy.-3
In theory, then, the Florida legislature has the authority to make
the policy choices determining the protection or attachment of pension
funds in bankruptcy. Indeed, the Florida legislature created an exemption for "[a]ny interest ... in a retirement or profit-sharing plan...
from all claims of creditors."' In practice, however, ERISA preemption225 threatens the controlling force of Florida's statute protecting
pension funds from creditors in bankruptcy.2 6 Because of the uncer-

216. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
218. See generally Note, Jurisprudence: The "New Haven School" and the Emergence of
Secondary Authority - Is Number Two Trying Harder?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 1031, 1054 (1989)
(provides a jurisprudential viewpoint regarding decisions being a series of policy choices).
219. Id.
220. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
221. Id.
222. FLA. STAT. § 222.21 (1989).
223. Id.
224. Id. § 222.21(2)(a).
225. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., In re Hirsch, 98 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1988); In re McLeod, 102 Bankr.
60 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1989); In re Brown, 95 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989); In re Sellers,
107 Bankr. 152 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (held that state law exempting ERISA-qualified plan
was preempted by ERISA § 514(a) [re-codified as § 1144(a)] of ERISA). But see In re Dyke,
119 Bankr. 536 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990) (held that state law exempting ERISA-qualified plan
was not preempted by ERISA § 514(a)).
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tainty of state exemption statutes, the treatment of pension funds in

bankruptcy has come "full circle" and resulted in a post-Code exclusion
analysis very similar to the pre-Code treatment. Once again, courts,
instead of the Florida legislature, are making decisions based on a
judicial, rather than legislative, weighing of the policies in conflict.
A. ERISA Preemption
Although an in-depth discussion of ERISA is beyond the scope of
this note, some elementary principles of ERISA are important to the
issue of pension plans in bankruptcy. ERISA differentiates between
welfare benefit plans and retirement plans.2 7 A welfare benefit plan
provides benefits to employees up to retirement.- An employee
hardship loan provision is an example of a welfare benefit plan.2 9 In
comparison, retirement plans cover retirement or death benefits
only.23o Under ERISA, welfare benefit plans are subject to creditors'
claims.' 1 ERISA, however, protects retirement plans from the reach
of creditors.m
Section 1144(a) of ERISA provides in part that ERISA "shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan."' The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that Congress intended ERISA to have broad,
sweeping preemptive power.2 A state statute that mentions or relates
to an ERISA plan is subject to ERISA preemption.2
In addition, courts have held that Congress intended to federalize
the private employee welfare and pension plans.26 Consequently,
ERISA preemption reaches "state laws that in fact affect covered
plans, whether or not those laws were expressly made applicable to

227.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. § 1056(d).
232. Id.
233. Id. § 1144(a).
234. See Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Servs., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988); supra
note 10.
235. See supra note 10.
236. See Sommers Drugstores v. Corrigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1034, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987) In re Komet, 93 Bankr. 498 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1988), vacated in part, 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (these cases held
that ERISA preempts state law if the state statute specifically refers to ERISA or if the state
statute refers to the qualifying provisions of the Internal Revenue Code).
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such plans."' 3 Courts have held that state laws governing such plans
interfered with ERISA and therefore, were invalid.m
As a result, the sweeping scope of ERISA has undercut the authority of states to apply state exemption laws under the Code. Courts
rejected the argument that debtors applying state exemption laws
under the authority of Code section 522 should be protected from
preemption.- 9 The courts held that the Code's reference to state
exemptions did not override ERISA preemption.?O
Consequently, a Florida debtor, attempting to protect pension assets from creditors' claims in bankruptcy, must rely on the Florida
exemption statute and "hope" that ERISA does not preempt it. The
uncertainty of whether ERISA will preempt a state exemption statute
is based on the number of different retirement plan options' 1 and the
numerous types of specific plans. 22 A threshold issue affecting ERISA
3
preemption is determining if the plan in question is ERISA-qualified?
and whether it is a welfare benefit plan or a retirement plan according
to ERISA definitions.In contrast to debtors in states that apply state exemptions only,
debtors in states that provide an option between state and federal
exemptions can exempt pension plans under Code section 522(d).2 5
The Code exempts certain types of pension and retirement benefits
from the bankruptcy estate "to the extent [the funds are] reasonably
necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the
debtor. 16
According to an ERISA provision, ERISA preemption does not
threaten the Code-created exemptions. "[ERISA shall not] alter,
amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United
States.''1

7

Therefore, debtors, having an option between state and

federal exemptions, can apply the Code exemptions to protect a plan

237. Sherman, supra note 91, at 255.
238. See cases cited supra note 236.
239. See cases cited supra note 7.
240. Id.
241. See generally Schlosser, Exempting Retirement Benefits from Bankruptcy in Colorado,
18 COLO. LAW. 17 (1989) (there are four broad categories of retirement plans: the welfare
benefit plan, the employee contribution plan, the Keogh plan, and the IRA).
242. See id.
243. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
244. See id.
245. Id. § 522(d)(10)(E).
246. Id.

247.

Id. § 1144(d).
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that otherwise would not be exempt under the ERISA preemption
doctrine. Here, there is no uncertainty because the Code's section
552(d), exempting pension assets from creditors' claims, is not subject
to the ERISA preemption doctrine.m
B. Spendthrift Trust Roll-Over
A survey of various states indicates that the problem of pension
funds in bankruptcy has been addressed by state exemption statutes.
For example, Georgia, Colorado, Tennessee, and Texas created statutes providing for the exemption of a debtor's interest in: (a) ERISA
employee welfare benefit plans;?' 9 (b) ERISA-qualified pension plans; 2
(c) pension plans qualified under the Internal Revenue Code;51 and
(d) retirement plans qualified under the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.

2

ERISA preemption has rendered most of these statutes in-

applicable to debtors' pension assets in bankruptcy.m
Unique statutes have not survived ERISA preemption.2 Most
recently, the Bankruptcy Court of the Middle District of Florida ruled

248. Id.
249. See, e.g., Mackey, 486 U.S. at 825 (the Court invalidated a Georgia statute exempting
ERISA employee welfare benefit plans from attachment and garnishment actions).
250. See, e.g., In re Alagna, 107 Bankr. 301 (Bankr. Colo. 1989) (holding that the Colorado
statute exempting a debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension plan was preempted by
ERISA).
251. See, e.g., In re Sellers, 107 Bankr. 152 (Banklr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding that a
Tennessee statute exempting a debtor's interest in pension plans qualified under the I.R.C. §§
401(a), 403(a)-(b) was preempted by ERISA).
252. See, e.g., In re Dyke, 119 Bankr. 536 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that a Texas statute
exempting a debtor's interest in a retirement plan qualified under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 was not preempted by ERISA).
253. See cases cited supra notes 249-52.
254. See In re Mata, 115 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. Colo. 1990) (a garnishment and levy statute,
for the purposes of claiming an exemption in bankruptcy only, held not valid); In re Lennen,
71 Bankr. 80 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (The court invalidated a statute creating a separate
exemption scheme for bankruptcy cases under a geographic uniformity test. This case was
decided pre-Mackey and the ERISA preemption cases.).
See also In re Perkins, 902 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Summers, 108 Bankr. 200 (Bankr.
S.D. Ill. 1989) (The court discussed the application of a new pension exemption statute providing
a conclusive presumption that a retirement plan is a spendthrift trust. Both cases were decided
on procedural grounds without reaching the question of ERISA preemption of the new statute.);
In re Rosenquist, 122 Bankr. 775 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (court held that Fla. Stat. §§
222.21(2)(a) and 222.201 are preempted by ERISA); In re Balay, 113 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1990) (discussing an Illinois exemption statute giving a conclusive presumption that retirement
funds are spendthrift trusts, but not deciding on the merits of the statute). Balay also provides
a discussion of the issue of timing and whether a trustee can claim rights to property in which

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

27

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

that ERISA preempted a 1987 Florida statute permitting an individual

debtor in bankruptcy to claim federal exemptions in addition to state
exemptions.- Debtors argued that Florida Statutes section 222.201
allowed the exemption of pension assets to the extent permitted under

Code section 522(d)(10)(E).2

Although the Florida statute did not

mention ERISA-qualified pension plans, the court held that ERISA
preempted the Florida exemption statute.Another statute, so new that it has not yet been challenged under
the ERISA preemption doctrine, provides that a retirement plan is

conclusively presumed to be a spendthrift trust under Illinois law.3
This is a novel approach that shifts the burden of proof to the bankruptcy trustee. Under the Illinois statute, the bankruptcy trustee has
the burden to prove that the debtor's retirement fund is not a
spendthrift trust.- 9 This provision attaches to the trustee not only the
burden of proof, but the burden of expensive litigation.

the debtor does not have a present right. Balay, 113 Bankr. at 443. The debtor's right to access
pension funds was contingent on a triggering event of death, retirement or termination. Id.
The court held that "to the extent an interest is limited in the hands of a debtor, it is equally
limited as property of the estate." Id. at 444 (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 541.06,
at 541-27 (15th ed. 1989)).
255. See In re Rosenquist, 122 Bankr. 775, 783 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) ("In 1987, the
Florida Legislature enacted what is now Section 222.201, Florida Statutes 1989, which provides
that: (1) Notwithstanding § 222.20, an individual debtor under the federal Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 may exempt, in addition to any other exemptions allowed under state law, any
property listed in subsection (d)(10) of § 522 of that act.").
256. Id.
257. Id. Other Florida bankruptcy cases have held that ERISA preempts Fla. Stat. §
222.21(2)(a) which expressly exempts pension and retirement plans. See In re Schlein, 114 Bankr.
780 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Lee, 119 Bankr. 833 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Sheppard,
106 Bankr. 724 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989); In re Bryant, 106 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989);
but see In re Martinez, 107 Bankr. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); In re Seilkop, 107 Bankr. 776
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989); In re Bryan, 106 Bankr. 749 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989).
258. Illinois Public Act. No. 86-0393, enacted Aug. 28, 1989, amending the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure
12-1006(c), provides that:
A retirement plan that is (i) intended in good faith to qualify as a retirement
plan under the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as now
or hereafter amended, or (ii) a public employee pension plan created under the
Illinois Pension Code, as now or hereafter amended, is conclusively presumed to
be a spendthrift trust under the law of Illinois.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
12-1006(c) (1989).
Cases focusing on the application of
12-1006(c) have all been determined on procedural
grounds. See In re Perkins, 902 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1990); In re Peacock, 119 Bankr. 605 (Bankr.
N.D. Il1. 1990); In re Balay, 113 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); In re Lyons, 114 Bankr.
572 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds 118 Bankr. 634 (C.D. Ill. 1990); In re Smith, 115
Bankr. 144 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990); In re Summers, 108 Bankr. 200 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989).
259. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 12-1006 (1989).
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The Illinois approach, however, is not a solution to be followed by
Florida for the following reasons. First, Illinois case law defines
spendthrift trust more narrowly than Florida case law. Second, the
Illinois statute only applies to retirement plans.261 While the statute
does not define the term retirement plan, under ERISA a retirement
a
plan is distinguished from a welfare benefit plan. 26 ERISA defines
2
retirement plan as covering retirement or death benefits only.

6

Arguably, those funds available upon termination of employment
are not traditional retirement plans. Therefore, the Illinois statute
would not apply to the "distribution upon termination" issue addressed
by many Florida courts. 26 To broaden the conclusive presumption to

all pension funds, however, would increase the likelihood of ERISA
preemption, and possible invalidation. The third reason for carefully
scrutinizing the Illinois statute relates to the creation of the presumption itself. Using evidentiary rules to change substantive law without
2
a showing of the probabilities involved is questionable. 6
Florida might avoid the complication and uncertainty of ERISA
preemption by focusing the solution to the "pension fund in bankruptcy" conundrum on the spendthrift trust issue. As previously discussed,
the nexus between bankruptcy, spendthrift trust law and the issue of
whether pension assets belong to the estate is created by section
541(c)(2) of the Code.m This section carves out a narrow exception for
law from the
spendthrift trusts recognized under applicable state
2
Code's broad definition of property of the estate.

6

Florida courts have defined a spendthrift trust as a fund that
provides for the maintenance of the beneficiary while at the same time
secures against alienation or assignment of the beneficiary's interest

260.

See supranotes 148-52 and accompanying text. Compare In re Balay, 113 Bankr. 429,

442 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (Illinois law defines a spendthrift trust as "(1) the trust must contain
an anti-alienation provision; (2) the trust must not be self-settled; and (3) the property of the
trust must be out of the control of the beneficiary.") with In re Nichols, 42 Bankr. 772, 776
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984) (Florida law recognizes spendthrift trusts as "designed-to provide a

fund for the maintenance of the beneficiary while at the same time securing it against the
beneficiary's own improvidence.").
261.
262.
263.
264.

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 110, 12-1006(c) (1989).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
Id.
See supra notes 162-90 and accompanying text.

265.

Interview with Christopher Slobogin, Professor of Law, University of Florida College

of Law, in Gainesville, Fla. (Nov. 6, 1989). See generally Note, The Improper Use of Presumptions in Recent CriminalLaw Adjudication, 38 STAN. L. REv. 423 (1986) (arguing that permis-

sive presumptions improperly influence jury verdicts).
266.

11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).

267.

See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

either by the beneficiary or by the beneficiary's creditors.2 Pension
plans that provide for accumulated savings of retirement income and
are outside the dominion and control of the beneficiary are consistent
with the definition of spendthrift trusts under Florida law.2 9 In proposing a solution to the pension fund in bankruptcy issue, this note
suggests a spendthrift trust rollover statute. 7 ° The legislature can
stipulate that property distributed upon termination of employment
maintains its spendthrift trust characterization if rolled over into
another spendthrift trust plan.
In fashioning a statutory solution, the ERISA preemption doctrine
looms as a threat to a state-created policy regarding pension plans in
bankruptcy.-, A spendthrift trust rollover statute, however, addressing the state qualifications for spendthrift trusts may escape ERISA
preemption for the following two reasons. First, a statute stipulating
state qualifications for spendthrift trusts does not mention or relate
to an ERISA qualified welfare benefit plan. 2- 2 Therefore, ERISA section 1144(a), providing that ERISA supersedes state laws regarding
ERISA-qualified plans, may not apply. 273
Secondly, the authority to exclude spendthrift trusts emanates from
the Code. 274 As discussed above, ERISA does not preempt other federal laws. Because ERISA does not interfere with the Code provision
excluding spendthrift trusts from the estate, a state statute defining
spendthrift trusts should survive ERISA preemption.
Far from interfering with any federal laws, a state-defined qualifying statute for spendthrift trusts merely replaces the current "dominion and control" test with a state mandated policy choice. A definitional
statute places the "seat" of the decisionmaking process in the legislature rather than the courts. 275 As a result, the courts do not have to
weigh the value of the property against the rights of debtors and
creditors in bankruptcy. Also, debtors with limited financial resources
will not be at a disadvantage, as compared to creditors, trying to
protect their pension assets through expensive litigation.
In developing a statutory solution, the legislature can affirmatively
address the issue that has created varying results in the courts. The
issue that presents the most uncertainty is the distribution upon ter268. See supra note 148.
269. See cases cited supra note 108.
270. The author thanks Willis W. Williams, III, J.D., C.P.A., Lakeland, Fla., who helped
crystallize these ideas - especially the spendthrift trust statutory solution.
271. See cases cited supra notes 7 & 10.
272. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
273. See id.
274. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
275. See Note, supra note 218.
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mination factor. 276 The courts have disagreed on whether the ability
to receive funds upon termination of employment constituted dominion
and control over the plan by the beneficiary/debtor. 277 Some courts
have determined that the ability to receive funds upon termination
disqualified the plan as a spendthrift trust.m
Central to the distribution-upon-termination factor are the competing tensions which evince the question of who has a right to the
property and for what purpose. Ideally, retirement funds should be
unavailable until retirement. This view is consistent with ERISA and
traditional spendthrift trust law. The reality in today's workforce,
however, is that employees are mobile, rarely staying with one employer until retirement. It would be unfair to jeopardize an individual's
pension assets merely because he or she changes employment. Similarly, employers do not want the administrative responsibility of controlling the pension funds of employees who worked for a short time
and moved on to another employer.
The practical aspects of employment today necessitate a more flexible approach to the safeguarding of retirement funds. Therefore, a
spendthrift trust rollover statute, stipulating that a fund to be distributed upon termination of employment can be rolled over without losing
its spendthrift trust characterization, provides a clear legislative statement to guide courts. The message is clear that a distribution upon
termination provision will not automatically disqualify a plan as a
spendthrift trust.
In addition, the intent of this proposed solution is to ensure that
the funds, even if within the temporary control of the beneficiary/debtor, are safeguarded for retirement. The rollover stipulation preserves the plan's purpose to accumulate and protect funds for retirement. 279 This solution is consistent with the equities of ERISA and
the Code.
While a state rollover statute is a "forced" solution,mo it is necessary
because Congress's silence has created a gap in the law. The ideal
solution is for Congress to speak. The possibilities for Congress to
clarify the problem and create a uniform applicable solution are, no
doubt, numerous. Congress could amend Code section 541(c)(2) to
include pension funds. Alternatively, Congress could add a provision
276. See supra notes 162-90 and accompanying text.

277. Id.
278.

Id.

279. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
280. The proposed rollover statute provides a solution of 'Torm" not "substance." The
solution does not address the substantive issue of whether "distribution upon termination"
constitutes "dominion and control" over the plan by the debtor/beneficiary. While not answering
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to the Code that specifically addresses pension funds and applies to
debtors whether residing in "opting out" states or not. 1 In addition,
Congress could amend ERISA to limit its preemptive scope or expressly exempt ERISA plans from the reach of creditors altogether.
In the absence of a federal solution, the proposed Florida rollover
statute attempts to provide an answer that protects what often is the
single largest asset of many debtors in bankruptcy, while also
safeguarding these funds for retirement years. The statutory schemes
of both ERISA and the Code are aimed at protecting funds set aside
for retirement from creditors' claims.2 It is inequitable that assets
should lose this well established protection merely because an employee can withdraw from the plan upon termination of employment.
A rollover statute, however, would prevent an employee from exercising absolute control over funds that, at the same time, are exempt
from creditors' claims.2 This latter scenario would violate the policies
of the Code, ERISA, and spendthrift trust law.
Finally, a solution in the nature of a' spendthrift trust rollover
statute places the "seat" of policymaking with the state legislature.
This is consistent with the Code. The Code carves out the spendthrift
trust "safe harbor," but allocates to the state the definitional task.
the substantive issue, this solution provides a "bright line" test that presumably offers ease of
applicability and a measure of predictability. In addition, the rollover statute answers the issue
on which courts vary and dispenses with the need for an in-depth factual determination.
One of the flaws of this solution is that the debtor/employee's ability to receive the funds
by quitting his or her job can be construed as "dominion and control" by the beneficiary over
the plan. In other words, the decision to voluntarily quit one's job is within the total control
of the employee. Indeed, many courts have held that distribution upon termination is sufficient
dominion and control to disqualify the plan as a spendthrift trust. See supra notes 173-90 and
accompanying text.
There is a line of cases, however, that has applied to pension assets the well established
principle that a trustee's claim to property (for the estate) is no greater than a debtor's claim
at the time of filing. See In re Perkins, 902 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1990)); In re Smith, 103 Bankr.
882 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989); In re Silldorff, 96 Bankr. 859 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989); In re
DeWeese, 47 Bankr. 251 (Bankr. W.D. N.C. 1985). While this issue is more a question of timing
which is not a part of the spendthrift trust analysis, this line of reasoning supports the notion
that the arbitrary "line-drawing" (if this rollover proposal does not violate the spirit of the Code.
If, hypothetically, a debtor could go through a Chapter 7 or 13 bankruptcy, get his or her
debts discharged, and subsequently withdraw accumulated pension assets by quitting a job, this
seems unfair. Perhaps, under such a scenario, creditors would have recourse to seek revocation
of the discharge under a theory of fraud. This proposal, however, does not answer those hypotheticals.
281. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 2 & 6 and accompanying text.
283. The proposed statute would bring pension plans within the definition of spendthrift
trusts as defined by Florida. See In re Nichols, 42 Bankr. 772, 776 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984);
supra note 148.
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IX.

CONCLUSION

Pension assets in bankruptcy present a dilemma of competing policy
choices. Traditionally, public policy has protected pension assets from
the claims of creditors because society encourages the accumulation
and protection of income for retirement. Public policy, however, has
disfavored "any person from placing his property in what amounts to
a revocable trust for his own benefit which would be exempt from
the claims of his creditors."
Today, with the many pension plan options, it is difficult to classify
property that is strictly saved for retirement from property in which
employees enjoy present benefits. If employees have use of the funds
before retirement, the underlying purpose of a pension plan is not
served. The mobility of today's workforce, however, has resulted in
pension plans that allow employees to withdraw funds upon termination of employment. This latter factor, distribution upon termination,
creates uncertainty among courts about the actual use of the funds
for retirement income. As a result, courts have allowed pension assets,
where in doubt about their intended purpose, to be available for the
satisfaction of creditors' claims in bankruptcy.
One protection of pension assets in bankruptcy is the Code's
spendthrift trust restriction. This provision carves out a "safe harbor"
for spendthrift trusts recognized under applicable state laws and
excludes the trust property from being classified as estate property.
The Code allocated the task of defining a spendthrift trust to the
states. States, however, have abdicated the job of deciding when and
if a pension plan qualifies as a spendthrift trust and have left the
courts to decide. One reason for this abdication is the sweeping power
of ERISA preemption.
This note proposes a solution to protect pension assets in bankruptcy that hopefully will survive ERISA preemption. The solution
is in the nature of a spendthrift trust rollover statute. Because the
proposed statute defines spendthrift trusts, the legislature is acting
within the authority mandated by the Code. In addition, this solution
allows the legislature to dictate to the courts the policy of choice and
spares individual debtors the expense of extended litigation. The Code
carves out the spendthrift trust "safe harbor;" it is for state legislatures
to make the policy choices that define a spendthrift trust.
Terri R. Day

284. Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust, 750 F.2d 1488, 1489 (11th Cir. 1985); see supra text
accompanying notes 125-29.
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